中印边界局势紧张是因为民族主义情绪？
John Cherian：据您分析，为什么2017年后中印边境实际控制线沿线的紧张局势急剧升级？您是否认为两国强烈的民族主义情绪是该问题背后的原因之一？
周波：我认为，中印边境紧张局势的根本原因显然不在于中国的“民族主义”情绪。中国有充分理由确保中印边境的和平，这也是中方一贯的态度。如果我们从大局来看，在中国被迫与美国竞争，特别是由于台湾地区执政的民进党的所作所为和美国的干涉造成台湾问题对中国愈发棘手情况下，中方没有理由在边境实际控制线上对印度施压。
我曾多次参与该问题的双边研讨会。参与该问题的讨论。我一直对印度学者说，如果你们认为中国在边境问题上预谋在先、刻意挑衅印度，那完全是误解，我们没有必要这样做。因此，我不同意你关于民族主义影响中方决策的说法。在与我交谈中，印度学者谈到中国修建直通中印边境的道路，他们似乎认为中方此举的目的是加强边境地区的防务部署。这种理解是错误的。其实中印双方都在修建直通边境的公路。
中方修路还有一个原因，那就是中国一直在为扶贫做出巨大努力。我的经验是，要想富先修路。这是中国从四十多年改革历程中得出的结论之一，也是中国推进“一带一路”倡议的原因之一，因为我们确实擅长基础设施建设。那么，当中国在全国各地修建道路设施，尤其涉及到边境地区时，邻国是否会将其视为一种军事措施？你或许会说，高速公路或快速路能用于飞机起飞，但这不是修建公路的主要目的。如果你只从另一个角度来看这个问题，可能会产生误解。我需要解释这一点。
John Cherian：那么中国对印度在中印边境实控线附近加快基础设施建设有意见吗？
周波：我认为这就像军备竞赛中典型的两难境地。无论一方做什么，都可能被另一方视为一种军事准备。如果两者之间存有某种怨恨或敌意，就可能会导致另一方采取一些行动作为回应。多年前，我曾从事与南亚相关的工作，当时我经常听说，印度人在印方一侧修路，导致我们处于劣势。但是我凭直觉认为，中国更擅长基础设施建设，所以我们的道路设施可能更好，或者现在修得更快。
John Cherian：自2017年的洞朗对峙事件以来，中印边境的紧张局势显著加剧。洞朗事件是中印关系的一个转折点，您是否认同我的这一观点？
周波：洞朗事件的发生令人非常遗憾。特别是中印两国在1993年之后的几十年里已经维持了相当长时间的和平，洞朗事件实在出乎中方意料。因为我们知道印度认为洞朗地区是不丹的领土，而我们认为洞朗地区属于中国领土，但至少双方都不认为这是印度的领土。
John Cherian: 就是说洞朗的边界是在不丹与中国之间，而不是在中印之间，对吗？
周波：我说的就是，印度认为洞朗是不丹领土，而我们认为洞朗是中国领土，但中印两国都不认为洞朗是印度领土。那么，印度为什么要跳出来干涉？根据我对印度与不丹双边关系所做的一些研究，2007年的《印度-不丹友好条约》只要求两国在涉及国家利益的问题上密切合作。事实上，这与你们过去的做法已经有很大的不同。例如，1949年的双边条约曾明确规定，不丹的外交政策和外交事务必须接受印度的“指导”。
通过比较就会发现，印度与不丹间的关系不是很正常的国家间关系。我想你们到2007年时终于发现，指导另一个国家的外交政策实在不合适。印度为何要“指导”另一个国家的外交政策？这说明你们实际上接替英国政府“指导”了不丹的外交政策。而后你们在2007年放弃了这一做法，改为在涉及国家利益的问题上密切合作。这样固然没问题，但你们派兵在中国与不丹之间插一杠子，这实在太过分了。我知道在印度，这被广泛视为你们的胜利。但我不认为这是一场胜利，因为此事表明，与印度无关的事情也可能成为中印之间的问题，这令中方感到无比震惊。当然我不认为这是加勒万河谷冲突事件的直接原因。事实上，中印双方（在加勒万河谷冲突事件中）都有伤亡。
新的领导人会晤将有巨大帮助
John Cherian：在印度前总理拉吉夫·甘地与当时的中国领导人邓小平会晤后，中印边境实际控制线沿线在很长一段时间保持了相对平静。您认为再举行一次领导人峰会，会有帮助吗？习主席曾在三年前到访印度，但效果不大。需要马上再有一次峰会吗？
周波：我认为新的领导人会晤将有巨大的帮助。正是因为在拉吉夫·甘地访华期间，中印两国领导人提出了一些总体指导准则，然后在1993年，我们双方首次达成了《在中印边境实际控制线地区保持和平与安宁的协定》。我注意到，在（去年的）G20巴厘岛峰会上，莫迪总理与习近平主席握了握手。明年的G20峰会将在印度举行。莫迪总理与习近平主席握手是友好的表示。鉴于边境问题可能很难解决，我认为双方可以先达成一些总的原则，并重申愿在边境地区保持和平安宁而不发生任何冲突，这最符合两国的利益。
当人们研判加勒万河谷冲突事件时，得出的几乎都是负面的教训，但我从中看到一些积极的东西。首先，中印在过去建立的信任措施发挥了作用，因为双方都没有试图向对方开枪。这是迄今为止双方最重要的共识。这意味着无论士兵们如何打斗，他们在潜意识里都知道不能向对方开枪。不过据我所知，有印度士兵向空中鸣枪以示警告。
因此，我们可以说，这些建立信任措施的协议——至少其中的五个——发挥了作用。虽然这些措施没有得到充分执行，但已经能让双方士兵不向对方开枪，这一点非常重要。在21世纪的今天，两个亚洲大国面临如此困难的情况，也没有试图向对方开枪，我相信，这对双方来说都是一个很好的经验教训。如果我们牢记这一点，且双方领导人下达杜绝此类事件再次发生的明确指示，我相信两国有望在边境地区再维持至少40年的和平。这是可能的，尽管我认为中印边境问题不太可能在短期内解决。
Quad不会发展成“小北约”
John Cherian：在您看来，印度加入四国安全对话机制（Quad）是导致中印关系下滑的原因之一吗？
周波：首先，Quad的成立是由于中国，这是肯定的。真正的问题是，它是否针对中国。我相信美国、日本和澳大利亚一定程度都想把Quad发展成“反华俱乐部”，这三个国家已经是盟友，所以印度的态度对该机制的生存和发展至关重要。我总体认为，迄今为止，印度拒绝将Quad变成“反华俱乐部”。如果观察Quad，就会发现目前其唯一的军事成分仅是一个名为“马拉巴尔”的军事演习，仅此而已。
目前Quad正朝许多方向发展，包括疫苗分配、基础设施建设和应对气候变化。我对Quad在应对气候变化上能发挥多大作用表示怀疑，因为气候变化是一个全世界面临的共同问题，不可能仅靠四个国家来解决。我也不认为Quad会发展成类似北约或“小北约”的机制。事实上，我对印度外交政策的独立性有一定信心，相信你们的外交政策还不至于被其他国家牵着鼻子走。
John Cherian：您相信印度将保持其外交政策的战略自主性？
周波：是的，没错。
“亚洲世纪”已经到来
John Cherian：无论如何，中国仍然是印度最大的贸易伙伴，印度仍然积极参与金砖国家（BRICS）、俄印中三国机制（RIC）和上海合作组织（SCO），所以我认为双方还有很多合作空间。
周波：当然，我完全同意。一些印度人想太多了，以为印度拒绝加入“一带一路”会对中国造成打击。我不这么认为，因为“一带一路”的合作国家太多了，且印度已经是亚投行的成员，而亚投行实际上与“一带一路”存在很多联系。据我所知，印度拒绝加入“一带一路”是因为“一带一路”经过查谟-克什米尔。我认为，“一带一路”是一条沿线国家根据自身国情自愿参与的虚线，而非一条无缝衔接的实线。“一带一路”是中国的倡议，如果其他国家加入，我们当然欢迎。如果有些国家出于某些原因有所保留，我们也理解。尽管存在这一问题，中印两国在上海合作组织和金砖国家的机制中保持着良好的合作。
我想跟您谈一个更重要的事情。我坚信，“亚洲世纪”已经到来。国际社会普遍认为，全球地缘政治重心正在向东亚转移。在我看来，虽然欧洲心脏地带的战火不知道会持续多久，但这场乌克兰危机只会加速全球地缘政治重心转移的进程，人们的注意力将被吸引到东亚地区。我想进一步指出的是，“亚洲世纪”的来临不仅仅是因为中国在东亚的崛起，还因为印度、印度尼西亚等国家和东盟等组织的崛起。随着亚洲的集体崛起，“亚洲世纪”已经到来。十年后，中国可能成为全球第一大经济体。我说“可能”，是考虑到中国经济增长已经放缓，中国人口正在老龄化，有些人现在对这一目标表示怀疑。但这也难说，因为根据国际货币基金组织的数据，中国今年的经济增速或将超过5%。我不知道中国能否在未来十年内保持5%的经济增速，但如果我们能做到，那么中国将成为世界上最大的经济体，而印度十年后可能成为世界第三大经济体。因此，我们两国如何处理彼此关系至关重要，因为这将成为一种完全不同的关系。
中印关系不仅仅等于边境问题
John Cherian：中国已经与除印度以外的所有国家解决了陆地边界问题，为什么唯独没解决与印度的边境问题？是不是因为中印边境问题太复杂了，涉及到英国殖民时代的遗留问题？以及地图的绘制方式？
周波：边境问题确实太复杂。中国没有理由不希望与印度解决边境问题，但是在一些最基本的认知上，中印两国都无法达成一致。例如，中国认为中印边界线长度是2000公里，而印度认为巴基斯坦将印度在克什米尔的领土割让给中国，所以（中印边界长度）是3488公里。如果我们连对边界线的长度认知都不一致，那怎么可能解决这个问题？在过去，中国的想法是东西段互相交换一部分，但印度不同意。中国希望采取由上至下的解决方法，双方先确定互让的原则，再开始做一些具体的工作。但印度认为，问题的根本原因是双方不知道实际控制线的走向，所以要求先勘察验证。印度提出的方法是自下而上的。
在上世纪90年代，我曾是中国边境谈判的军事专家，所以我知道解决该问题有多难。举个例子，为了解对方眼中有争议地区的具体位置，我们曾互换地图，但双方无法就哪些是争议地区达成一致。然而，我想说的是，至少我们达成了五个关于维持实际控制线附近和平与安宁的信任协议，这五个协议非常重要。在1993至2003年间，中国与印度的双边信任措施比中国与任何其他国家间的都多，相比之下，中国与美国只有2-3个信任协议。中印双边信任协议的内容非常具体，其中包括：在实际控制线附近，不应该举行师级以上演习；如果要开展旅级演习，应该事先通知对方；军用飞机不应该在距离实际控制线10公里内飞行；当一方的部队在巡逻时，另一方不应尾随。这些措施都非常详细。由于加勒万河谷冲突事件，一些人认为双方建立的信任措施失效了。我不同意这种说法，我认为这些措施仍然很有效。如果双方连巡逻部队相遇时的行为规则等细节都讨论过，哪里还需要新措施？当然，如果有人能指出我的观点有误，我会欣然接受。
我们需要政治承诺来避免此类事件的再次发生。我认为，我们应该仔细梳理这些信任措施，并认真地执行所有这些措施。有些事情确实困难，例如1993年协议提到的核查实际控制线。但还有很多其他事情可以做。例如，我在所撰写的文章中也建议，两国军队应在最危险的对峙区域脱离接触。这一点已经实现，双方已经在班公湖地区、温泉地区等处脱离接触，我认为这就是正确的问题处理方式。
John Cherian：中国新任外交部部长秦刚上任后不久曾表示，他的首要任务之一是改善与印度的关系，缓解中印边境实际控制线附近的紧张局势。我认为这是个明智的举动。但我认为，印度方面也需要有对等的表态。
周波：您的看法没错。我认为目前印度政府的态度正变得有点像拉吉夫·甘地访华之前的态度，即印度方面愿意处理边境问题，但在边境问题得到妥善处理前，印度认为两国关系的其他领域无法得到实质性改善。我认为这是错误的，市场力量也可以证明印方的这种态度是错误的。2021年，尽管印度政府对中资企业实施了打压，但中印双边贸易额仍创下历史新高。这就说明，在很多积极因素的作用下，中印两国间的关系变得更加牢固。如果中印关系不仅仅等于边境问题，双方关系就还是健康的。我由衷希望印度政府能够从更多元的角度来看待中印关系。正如我之前所言，我们不希望边境问题再次成为中印间的冲突爆发点。
（翻译：吴子浩；校对：韩桦申青青。本文文内小标题为编者所拟。）
专访英文版：
John Cherian: Why do you believe there has been an alarming rise in tensions along the LAC after 2017? Do you believe that muscular nationalism in both countries plays a role?
Zhou Bo: The fundamental reason for the tension, I believe is not because of nationalism on the Chinese side. The reason is simple. China has all good reasons to make sure that the border between China and India is peaceful. This kind of thing didn’t happen just now; it happened quite often in the past. And if we look at the bigger picture, there is no reason whatsoever from the Chinese side to add pressure on India on the Line of Actual Control, when China is forced into competition with the United States, and the Taiwan issue is becoming more difficult for China to handle, particularly because of the ruling DPP party in Taiwan and the interference from the United States.
I have been in quite a few bilateral seminars on this issue. I always told Indian scholars, if you believe China is purposefully ambushing India on the border issue, that is totally wrong. There’s no need for us to do that. So I don’t agree with what you have described; that nationalism would play a role in Chinese decision-making. And on the part of India, in my conversations with Indian scholars, they talked about China building roads leading to the border areas, as if China is doing it purposefully to increase its defence along the border. This is wrong. The fact is both sides are building roads leading to the border.
And there is another reason, that is, China has been making great efforts to alleviate poverty. We find through experience that good roads lead to a better life. This is one of the conclusions we have drawn from our reform in over 40 years. This is also one of the reasons why China is promoting the Belt & Road initiative because China is really good at infrastructure building. So, when we are building these road connections across China, especially when it comes to the border, would it be taken by the other side as a kind of military measure? Well, you can say that a highway or expressway could be used for an aircraft taking off, but it’s not the primary purpose for building a road. I think if you look from the other side, there could be a kind of misunderstanding. I just want to explain that.
John Cherian: But does China have any problems with India’s accelerated infrastructure building along the LAC?
Zhou Bo: I think this like the typical dilemma in the arms race. You know, whatever one side is doing might be viewed by the other side as a kind of a build-up. If there is a kind of acrimony or hostility between the two sides, this could just cause the other side to do something in response. When I was working on South Asian affairs a long time ago, I always heard things like how Indians are building roads on their side, therefore we are in the inferior position… but my conclusion is because China is better in infrastructure building, so our roads are probably better or we are building roads faster now. That is my gut feeling.
John Cherian: Tensions have noticeably risen since 2017, since the Doklam incident. If my view is correct, the Doklam incident was a kind of turning point in relations between the two countries?
Zhou Bo: It is most unfortunate to see what has happened in Doklam, especially because, first of all, we have maintained peace for quite some time, in fact for decades after 1993. And the Doklam incident is really a big surprise to China in that we know India believes that this is Bhutanese territory while we in China believe this is Chinese Territory. But at least neither side believes this is Indian territory.
John Cherian: The border was between Bhutan and China, not between India and China in Doklam, am I correct?
Zhou Bo: I mean even if India believes Doklam is Bhutanese territory, and we believe this is Chinese territory, none of us would believe this is Indian territory, right? So, why would India jump in to have this kind of interference? I did some research on your bilateral relationship with Bhutan, the India-Bhutan friendship treaty in 2007 only obliges you to cooperate closely with each other on issues related to the national interest. This actually came a long way from what you had in the past, for example, the treaty in 1949 that made clear that Bhutanese foreign policy and foreign affairs have to be guided by India.
So, if I compare this, I would find that your relationship with Bhutan is not a very normal, country-to-country relationship. I assume in 2007 you found finally that it was really not appropriate for you to guide another country’s foreign policy. Why would you guide a country’s foreign policy? Because that means you have actually succeeded the British government in “guiding” Bhutanese foreign policy. And then in 2007, you relinquished that and changed it to say you would cooperate closely on issues relating to the national interest. But even if this is alright, for you to send armed forces to stand between China and Bhutan, that really went too far. I know in India it was widely taken as a victory on your side. I don’t believe it is a victory because it shows really in a very alarming way how something that has nothing to do with India could become an issue between China and India. This is alarming for us, but I won’t say that this is the direct reason for the deadly brawl in the Galwan Valley. The fact is we also had casualties, as you did.
John Cherian: After former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping met, there was a long period of comparative calm along the LAC. Do you think another summit will help? I know President Xi was in India three years ago, and it didn’t really help. Do you think another meeting would be timely?
Zhou Bo: I would think it would help tremendously because it is during Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China that the leaders of the two countries actually put forward some general guidelines. Then in 1993, we have the first agreement of maintaining peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control. I saw Prime Minister Modi shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at G-20 in Bali for a very short time. Next year we’re going to have the G-20 in India. I believe Prime Minister Modi’s reaching out to President Xi is an olive branch. Because the border issue can be very difficult to resolve, I think some general guidelines and a reconfirmation for us to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border without any conflict at all best serve the interests of the two countries.
When people read about this conflict in the Galwan Valley, almost all the lessons they drew are negative, but I would still see something positive in this. The first point is that the confidence-building measures in the past have worked. Why? Because neither side has attempted to shoot at the other side. This is the most important agreement between the two sides so far. That means subconsciously, no matter how the soldiers fought, they knew they should not shoot at each other, although to my knowledge, Indian soldiers did shoot into the sky as a kind of warning.
So, we cannot argue that these confidence-building measures agreements-- at least five of them, didn’t work at all. True, they are not fully implemented, but they have worked to the extent that the soldiers did not try to shoot at each other. This is so important that in the 21st century, two giants in Asia in Asia didn’t attempt to shoot each other in this kind of difficult situation. I believe this is a good lesson for both of us. If we bear this in mind, and if our leaders give us clear instructions that this kind of thing should never happen again, I believe we probably could have at least another 40 years of peace along the border. This is possible, although I’m not so confident about resolving the border issue any time soon.
John Cherian: Do you think India’s membership of the QUAD has been a factor in the downslide in relations?
Zhou Bo: First of all, the formation of QUAD is because of China… definitely. The real question is, is QUAD against China? I believe the United States, along with Japan and Australia, would want to make it a kind of club that is against China. India, of course, is a lynchpin in that the other three are already allies. Therefore, India’s attitude is critical. But I’m somewhat convinced that India so far has refused to make it the “Anti-China Club”. If you look at the QUAD, currently the only military element is a military exercise called the Malabar. There is nothing more than that.
It is evolving in many other directions like the distribution of vaccines, infrastructure, climate change. Actually, I have some doubts about how effective it would be if it is addressing an issue like climate change, because climate change is a universal problem. It cannot be resolved by four countries alone. I don’t think Quad will become a kind of NATO or mini-NATO organisation, either. Actually, I have some confidence in your foreign policy being independent or not being siphoned away so easily.
John Cherian: You mean you believe India will retain its strategic autonomy in foreign policy?
Zhou Bo: Yes, I think so.
John Cherian: But, despite everything, China continues to be India’s biggest trading partner. And India is still active in the BRICS, the RIC, Shanghai Cooperation and SCO. So I think there is still a lot of scope for cooperation...
Zhou Bo: Of course, I totally agree. Some Indians think too much about how India’s rejection of joining BRI would be a blow to China. I don’t think so, because BRI is so big, and you are already a member of the AIIB. The AIIB is actually having a lot of things to do with the BRI. I know you reject it because it passes through Jammu & Kashmir. But I consider BRI to be a dotted line along which countries volunteer to join in line with their actual conditions, not a whole line that is seamless. This is a Chinese proposal, if some other countries join it, of course we’re happy. But if some other countries have some reservations for certain reasons, we understand. In spite of this issue, we’re having good cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in BRICS.
I want to tell you something bigger than this. I truly believe the Asian century has already arrived. Very few people disagree that international geopolitics is shifting towards East Asia. And the war in Ukraine, in my opinion, would just accelerate this process. Of course, the war in the heart of Europe is raging on without a deadline. So things would move faster towards East Asia and people’s attention would be drawn to this part of the world. But the point I want to make is that it’s not only China standing tall in East Asia, it’s also because of the rise of other countries and organisations—such as India, Indonesia and organisations like ASEAN. So this rise is a collective rise of Asia. The Asian century has already arrived. In 10 years, China might become the largest economy in the world. I say “might” because there are some doubts about it now given that the Chinese economy has slowed down and the Chinese population is aging. But it’s hard to say because according to IMF, the Chinese economy this year could be more than 5%. Could we maintain this 5% in ten years to come? I don’t know, but if we can, then we will become the largest economy in the world and you would become the third largest economy in the world in ten years. So how we deal with each other becomes critical since the relationship is totally different.
John Cherian: China has solved its land border issues with all countries except India. Why? What is the real reason? Is it because it’s too complicated, the legacy of British imperialism, the way the map was drawn?
Zhou Bo: I think the border issue is too complicated. There’s no reason why China doesn’t want to resolve the border issue with India. You see, the border is complicated to the extent that even the simplest things cannot be agreed upon. For example, we believe the border is 2000 kilometres and you believe it’s 3488 km because Pakistan ceded Indian territory in Kashimir to China. If we cannot even agree on the length of the border, how can we possibly resolve it? And yes, historically, the Chinese idea is to have a kind of swap of land… the western sector with the eastern sector, but India disagrees. The Chinese approach is a top-down approach; let’s have the swap, and then we start to do something in detail. And you would say, well, the fundamental reason for this problem is because we do not know where the Line of Actual Control runs. So let’s verify it first. Your approach is bottom-up.
I have been a Chinese military expert in border negotiation back in 1990s, so I know how difficult this issue is. For example, we changed our maps to see where are the dispute areas in the eyes of the other side, but we could not agree that these are the disputed areas. But what I want to say is, at least, we have five agreements on confidence building regarding maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control. These five agreements are very important. I found China actually has more confidence-building measures with India than with any other countries — from 1993 to 2003. With the United States, in comparison, we only have 2-3 agreements. Between China and India, our agreements even mentioned how we should not conduct exercises above the division level along the line of actual control; how we should notify each other if we have a brigade level exercise; how we should not fly military aircraft within ten kilometres of the Line of Actual Control; how we should not follow the other side in patrol. These are very detailed. Because of the clash in Galwan Valley, some people argue that the confidence-building measures have failed. I disagree. I would say they are still very useful. If you have even talked about such details of how patrolling troops should behave during encounters, what new measures are needed? But I shall be happy if people can point out that I am really wrong.
We need a political commitment to not let this happen again. I believe we should comb through these measures to see how we can really, seriously implement all of them. Some things are difficult, for example, like the 1993 agreement to verify the Line of Actual Control, that is difficult. But there are so many things that can actually be done. For example, I have suggested even in my writing that the two militaries should deconflict from the most dangerous standoff points. And this happened exactly as I said. For example, we have deconflicted from the Pangong Tso lake, from Hot Spring etc. This is how I believe things could be managed.
John Cherian: The new Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang said in one of his first statements that one of his priorities is to improve relations with India and ease tensions along the LAC. I think that’s a good move. But, I think, a reciprocal move is still being awaited from the Indian side.
Zhou Bo: I think your observation is correct. I actually believe the Indian government’s attitude is becoming slightly like India’s attitude before Rajiv Gandhi visited China. That is, let’s deal with the border issue and until it is dealt with properly, the other fields of the relationship cannot improve substantively…. I think this is wrong, and market forces can prove it is wrong, too. In 2021, in spite of Indian government’s bashing of Chinese companies, bilateral trade still reached a historical record. That means the ties between the two countries are stronger now supported by more positive elements. If China-Indian relationship is not only about the border issue, this is a healthy thing. I really hope the Indian government can think about this from a more diversified perspective. As I mentioned before, we do not want this border issue to become a flashpoint between us again.
来源：澎湃新闻
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